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France has seen a marked deterioration in its export performance in the last 10 years or so. 
Previous empirical research pointed out that weak export performance was due to i) vigorous 
domestic demand; ii) lower mark-ups due to head-to-head competition with Germany; iii) low 
non-price competitiveness of French export goods; iv) offshoring of entire production 
processes (especially in the automobile sector); and v) difficulties of French manufacturing 
firms to reach critical size for exporting. This paper adds an additional explanation to this list. 
We argue that resource reallocation from the exporting to the construction sector triggered by 
fast rising property prices hindered France to meet world export demand vis-à-vis its 
products. Our econometric analysis shows that the resource reallocation argument helps 
explain French export performance between the early 2000s and 2007, unexplained by 
traditional models. This result is confirmed for a set of OECD countries that experienced a 
marked decline in their export performance and sustained real-estate boom after 2000. 
JEL-Code: F10, F14, O14, O52. 
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1.  Introduction 
  France has seen a marked decline in its export performance in recent years, leading to growing 
concerns on the part of the authorities and of civil society about the economy’s capacity to adapt to an 
intensified globalisation of trade in goods and services. The country is not an exception in this respect, as 
virtually all advanced economies have experienced declines in their market shares since the turn of the 
millennium. Yet, with growing market shares by value and volume, Germany appears to be a notable 
exception. However, French firms have not so much suffered from an insufficient worldwide demand than 
of a problem of supplying foreign markets that were rapidly growing until 2007. Despite a favourable 
sectoral specialization and geographic orientation of trade, difficulties in selling abroad led to deeper losses 
in market shares than in many other leading economies between 2000 and 2007. Even though the 
appreciation of the exchange rate has tightened competitiveness conditions, half of French exports are 
made within the euro area. The puzzle of French export performance is reflected by the fact that a 
traditional export equation including indicators of export market growth and price competitiveness fails to 
account for the relative inability to service foreign markets in the pre-crisis period of 2000s. 
  Various explanations have been proposed in the literature to shed light on this puzzle. With no 
doubt, the emergence of new exporters with strong trade potential – such as China and other Asian or 
Eastern European countries – has led to a mechanical decline in market shares of leading economies. 
However, market share losses have not been equally distributed, and some economies proved to be more 
resilient than others. In the case of France, the literature has put emphasis on different supply-side factors 
that might have driven export performance. Among them, the existence of a vigorous domestic demand; 
head-to-head competition with German businesses leading to pressures over margins and a strong selection 
of exporters; low non-price competitiveness due to insufficient R&D spending and innovation content of 
French goods; the decision of some French producers (especially in the automotive industry) to offshore 
the entire production process; and the difficulties for firms to grow and reach a critical size for exporting. 
  In this paper, we provide an additional explanation for underperforming French exports. More 
precisely, we test the hypothesis that existing resources have been reallocated between tradable and 
non-tradable sectors of the economy, to the detriment of the manufacturing sector and to the benefit of 
sectors of construction and real estate activities, among others. Following the steep rise of real estate prices 
until 2007 that sector enjoyed very high margins and could offer more advantageous compensation terms, 
thus attracting fresh capital and labour respectively. Empirical studies on OECD countries confirm that 
higher real estate prices can trigger an inter-sectoral reallocation of labour (Bover and Jimeno, 2007). 
Conefrey and FitzGerald (2009) also provide evidence that the housing boom in Ireland and Spain could 
have pre-empted resources from more productive uses with housing investment reaching as much as 14% 
of GDP in the former and 9% in the latter in 2005. A set of stylized facts and econometric regressions 
performed in this paper tend to support the view that a strong profitability in the construction industry, fed 
by rising house prices, might have diverted a portion of capital and labour resources away from export 
activity in France. 
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the main characteristics and 
scope of the French export underperformance, while Section 3 describes different explanations that have 
been advanced so far to explain it. Section 4 advances various stylized facts that support the assumption of 
inter-sectoral reallocation of resources. Section 5 presents testable equations, Section 6 econometric issues, 
Section 7 empirical results, and Section 8 extends the empirical analysis to other OECD countries. The last 
section concludes. 
2.  Scope and characterization of the export problem 
  France plays a leading role in international trade. It ranks fifth in world exports of goods and 
fourth in global services exports, while it is sixth in world imports of goods and services. In addition, it 
holds third place for foreign direct investment (FDI), both inward and outward. Despite this position, and 
the country’s strong integration into world trade flows, the trade balance in goods and services has swung  
from an average surplus of 2% of GDP in the second half of the 1990s to a deficit of nearly 2% of GDP 
in 2007. The growing role of export-oriented emerging countries in world trade, the appreciation of the 
euro, and the worsening of the energy balance cannot by themselves explain this pattern. Indeed, this 
evolution is in contrast with that of the best-performing industrialised countries. Over the same period, 
Germany’s trade surplus rose sharply, from 1% to 7% of GDP, while other euro area countries moved from 
a surplus of 2% to virtual equilibrium. In 2007, before the global downturn and international trade collapse, 
among OECD countries, half recorded a surplus, though eight others had bigger deficits than France 
(Figure  1). An analysis of the trade balance excluding energy shows that between 2002 and 2007 its 
deterioration was mainly driven by a few product categories (Usciati, 2008). These included automotive 
products, under the combined effect of falling exports and rising imports; consumer electronic goods, for 
which Asian imports rose sharply; and non-ferrous metals and organic chemicals and mining products, 
where rising raw material prices pushed up the price of imports. 
Figure 1. Trade balance in international comparison in 2007 

































































































Source: OECD, Economic Outlook No. 86 database. 
 
  The deterioration of the trade balance has been accompanied by a fall in France’s export 
performance as attested by pronounced losses of export market share (Figure 2). The French share in 
global exports of goods and services by value (volume) retreated on average by 3.0% (3.5%) each year 
between 2000 and 2007. This was one of the steepest drop of all OECD countries, with the exception of 
major raw-material exporters such as Canada, Australia and Norway. At the same time, and in an identical 
economic and monetary setting, other euro-area countries have also incurred losses in market shares, 
though to a smaller extent, while Germany has been an exception with its shares rising in value and volume 
terms. Indeed, the Euro-12 area (excluding France and Germany) recorded an average annual loss that was 
close to three (two) percentage points in value (volume) terms less than France’s. Yet, existing empirical 
evidence shows that the performance gap between France and Germany does not seem to be related to 
differences in geographic and sectoral specialisation. Indeed, the sectoral structure and geographic 
orientation of trade, at various levels of disaggregation, do not reveal any major differences between 
France and Germany in terms of specialisation (Boulhol and Maillard, 2006; Fontagné and Gaulier, 2008). 
Thus, a pure performance effect would explain most of the discrepancy in the two countries’ export 
outcomes.  
Figure 2. Market shares by value and volume in world exports of goods and services 
Average annual growth rate, 2000-07 
 



































































Source: OECD, Economic Outlook No. 86 database. 
 
  The generalised losses of export market share would result not from an inopportune international 
specialisation but from a relative inability to satisfy foreign demand. French industry was unable to 
respond fully to the accelerating worldwide demand for its products (i.e. its export market) between 2003 
and 2007 (Figure 3). In fact, the export market was growing at around 7.0% annually until 2007, but actual 
export growth was slightly below 4.0%. 
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1.  The export market measures the worldwide demand addressed to a country and is defined as domestic exports that would be 
expected if its market shares by volume remained at their value for the reference year, here 2005. 
Source: OECD, Economic Outlook No. 86 database. 
 
  The analysis of price and cost competitiveness indicators usually makes it possible to better work 
out a diagnosis of export performance. France has very good price competitiveness, similar to that of 
Germany and significantly better than the positions held by Italy and Spain (Figure 4). However, when 
introduced into an export equation, this variable cannot explain the decline in export market shares in the 
current decade (Villetelle and Nivat, 2006; Cochard, 2008; Blot and Cochard, 2008).   
Figure 4. Price competitiveness: export prices relative to all competitors 

























Source: OECD, Economic Outlook No. 86 database.  
 
3.  Major explanations of export underperformance 
  From the technical point of view several explanations have been suggested for interpreting the 
loss of explanatory power of the price competitiveness indicator in export equations (Fontagné and 
Gaullier, 2008). First, it gives a very imperfect reflection of ex ante performance, to the extent that there is 
a selection effect prior to export. In fact, this variable captures only the prices of “surviving” exporters, 
i.e. those who are more efficient or who face less competition in their markets. Second, French exporters, 
who are obliged to “price to market”, are constrained in their ability to reflect changes in costs or exchange 
rates in their prices, making the adjustment rather through lower margins. 
  More fundamentally, previous empirical research pointed to various explanatory factors of weak 
export performance and difficulties in supplying overseas markets. 
  First, relatively sustained domestic demand can be viewed as one possible explanation of the 
attractiveness of serving overseas markets (Erkel Rousse and Sylvander, 2007, 2008), which can indicate 
that exporting firms encounter a broad range of supply constraints (Cochard, 2008). 
  Second, because their sectoral specialisation and the geographic orientation of trade are so 
similar, France and Germany would be in direct competition not only in their own domestic markets but 
also on export markets. In  2005, Germany was France’s prime competitor on the market for goods, 
followed by the United States, Italy, the United Kingdom and Spain, with China appearing only in ninth 
position (IMF, 2008). In 2004, competitive pressure was less severe in the case of services, with Germany 
ranking fourth among the main competitors. Overall, these elements help to explain why the two countries 
pursue noticeably comparable export pricing policies, as evidenced by the great similarity of their 
respective price competitiveness indicators (Figure 4). 
  The head-to-head competition with Germany has been even more intense as the latter country has 
improved its cost competitiveness position significantly between 2004 and 2007, while some erosion has 
happened in France, but to a much smaller extent than in the case of Italy and Spain (Figure 5).
2 This boost 
to German competitiveness was made possible by very significant cuts in unit labour costs, under the 
                                                      
2  Germany’s enhanced cost competitiveness and the tendency to erosion by France must be viewed in 
perspective. Indeed, the 1990s saw the competitiveness of the two countries diverge, under the impact of 
the competitive disinflation strategy in France and the wage inflation that took place in Germany in the 
wake of reunification. Over the long term, however, cost competitiveness patterns would tend to even out 
(see Figure  5). By the end of  2007, Germany had largely restored its cost competitiveness to 
pre-unification levels, while France still benefited from a net advantage compared to the situation in 1991.  
combined effect of wage moderation and the development of a “bazaar economy”, aimed at breaking up 
the value chain so that activities that make more use of unskilled labour could be subcontracted to Eastern 
European countries (Sinn, 2006; Boulhol, 2006; Gaulier, 2008; Erkel Rousse and Sylvander, 2008). Such 
an offshore outsourcing strategy has also improved firms’ margins through a lower cost of intermediate 
inputs. Indeed, in the context of an appreciation of the exchange rate, although export margins have 
remained stable in the German case, French exporters have had to trim their margins significantly in order 
to offset the upward pressure from their relative unit labour costs and simultaneously maintain their price 
competitiveness. 
Figure 5. Cost competitiveness: unit labour costs relative to all competitors 
























Source: OECD, Economic Outlook No. 86 database. 
 
  Third, pressures over price and cost competitiveness may have dampened investment spending in 
general, and on R&D in particular, in the French export sector, thus leading to tighter supply-side 
constraints and an insufficient non-price competitiveness. In particular, the investment rate of the 
manufacturing industry declined in the first half of the decade and this for various sizes of firms (Conseil 
économique et social, 2008). Recent empirical studies confirm that the innovation deficit, as measured by a 
relatively low level of R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP, has been a drag on the country’s foreign 
trade performance (Cochard, 2008). Various survey measures also point to the existence of an innovation 
deficit of French products. According to an “image” survey conducted by Coe-Rexecode, French goods 
provide good value for money (Coe-Rexecode, 2006, 2007 and 2008). However, the non-price aspect such 
as the technological innovation content of both consumer and capital goods lags behind that of German, 
Italian and Japanese products. Moreover, the evolution of this criterion over time suggests that 
competitiveness has declined. Notwithstanding the erosion of export margins that may have dampened 
R&D efforts, this weakness may also reflect a framework and conditions that so far have not been 
sufficiently propitious for promoting the rapid development of innovation (OECD, 2009).  
  Fourth, in contrast to the “bazaar economy” model developed by Germany, France has opted for 
a strategy of offshoring the entire production process which has a negative impact on the trade balance. 
In  2006, the two French carmakers for the first time produced more vehicles abroad than in France 
(Fresson-Martinez,  2007). This policy was intended not only to serve growing foreign markets more 
readily, but also to supply the domestic market, while benefiting from reduced production costs. 
Between 2004 and 2007, automobile imports from countries where the main French carmakers have set up 
shop (Central and Eastern Europe, Turkey and Spain) accounted for around 60% of the average growth of 
total vehicle imports to France (Usciati, 2008). Hence, it is likely that when the trade balance is “corrected” 
using the methodology proposed by Schaff et al. (2008), where the criterion is the ownership rather than 
the location of firms, the trade deficit would have been lower. Viewed from that angle, market share losses  
may have been smaller than what the geographic definition of trade would suggest.
3 If this is the case, it 
would indicate that firms are suffering not so much from poor performance per se as from the poor 
competitiveness of the French territory where they have to operate. However, carmakers have also lost 
domestic and foreign market shares due to the competition of major industrialised countries (Italy, 
the United Kingdom, and especially Germany). These difficulties suggest supply-side problems relating to 
the production of models that are at the end of their life cycle or that are not in tune with demand 
(Bauer,  2008). If this is the case, it raises the question of non-price competitiveness and, as already 
suggested, the role of innovation policies in strengthening French industry’s product range. 
  Fifth, difficulties that exporting SMEs have in growing and achieving critical size for export may 
be another explanation (Artus and Fontagné, 2006), notably because tax, financial and regulatory 
conditions are also critical for determining trade competitiveness (OECD, 2009). Indeed, the probability 
that a firm will become an exporter rises with its size, as measured by the number of employees (Ceci and 
Valersteinas, 2006). Nearly 70% of French firms with more than 250 employees make sales abroad, versus 
slightly more than  20% of SMEs with between  10 and 249  employees, and only  2% of very small 
enterprises. In the absence of sufficient numbers of manufacturing-sector SMEs, as compared with 
Germany in particular, the French export sector is highly concentrated: large firms with more than 
250 employees are responsible for the majority of trade (55%), but they represent barely 3% of exporters. 
At the other extreme, very small enterprises with fewer than 20 employees account for more than 70% of 
exporters, but only 20% of total export sales. 
  In the rest of the paper, we investigate an additional explanation of the French export 
underperformance by highlighting whether changes in the allocation of labour and capital between tradable 
(manufacturing) and non-tradable (construction and real estate activities) sectors could have contributed to 
explain the deterioration of external competitiveness prior to the emergence of the current downturn. 
4.  House prices and resource reallocation: some stylized facts 
  Between 2000 and 2007, the number of exporting firms declined by around 10 000 (or 10%), and 
this coincided with pronounced market–share losses. The “selection effect” of international competition 
can lead to a greater concentration of firms engaged in external trade, as only the most productive 
exporters will be able to maintain their position on foreign markets. However, the available statistics show 
that the number of exporters rose significantly and steadily following 1995, and did not stop growing 
until 2000 or later. Moreover, the subsequent retreat affected all sizes of firms, including the largest ones. 
It would seem, then, that exporting has become less attractive overall. More specifically, among the 
various factors affecting France’s export performance in the first decade of the new century, it is possible 
that existing resources have been reallocated among different sectors, or that new resources have been 
allocated in favour of a given sector. Such effects are likely to have worked to the detriment of the 
manufacturing sector, which is highly exposed to international competition, and in favour of the 
construction sector, which is largely sheltered from foreign rivalry and has benefited from the booming 
real estate market. There are several stylised facts that would corroborate this hypothesis. 
  Since 2000 and until 2007, the French construction sector faced a very tight labour market, and 
this situation was very likely reinforced by the introduction of the 35-hour week. France had in fact one of 
the most severe labour shortages in this sector among the major EU countries (Figure 6). Yet it is striking 
to note that countries such as Spain, Ireland and the United Kingdom have faced very few constraints in 
                                                      
3 Schaff  et al.  (2008) define a “corrected” trade balance for the United  States, taking into account the 
strategies of American firms. To do so, they treat as exports the local sales of American subsidiaries abroad 
and consider as imports the purchases they make locally. Conversely, sales made by subsidiaries of foreign 
groups to Americans are recorded as imports for the United States, while the purchases they make locally 
are treated as exports. According to the authors’ calculations, such a methodological change reduces the 
US current account deficit by one-third.  
terms of labour availability, despite the much stronger construction booms they experienced during 2000s 
(Figure 7). Greater resort to foreign workers from Eastern Europe (in Ireland and the United Kingdom) or 
from North Africa and Latin America (in Spain) may help explain this paradox, while the French labour 
market was relatively closed at the same time, with temporary restrictions on labour mobility imposed on 
the new member countries of the European Union until May 2006.  
  In the wake of sizeable labour shortages, the construction industry has seen upward pressure on 
wages: the basic hourly wage for construction workers has been rising faster since 2002 than in the tertiary 
sector and in manufacturing (Figure 8). Similarly, since the end of 2002, the basic monthly salary for 
managers has also been rising somewhat faster in construction, although this comparison is limited by 
possible discrepancies in the number of hours worked. Upward wage pressure was to some extent 
attenuated with the opening of the building market to workers from Eastern Europe as of May 2006.
4 In 
any case, differentials in wage growth cannot be explained by productivity gaps. On the contrary, 
productivity has stagnated in construction since the year  2000, while it has increased steadily in 
manufacturing. Diverging wage trends have prompted a reallocation of labour between these two sectors, 
even if it is true that the skills demanded are not necessarily the same. Between  2000 and  2007, the 
construction industry’s share of aggregate employment rose by nearly one percentage point, with the sector 
accounting for a quarter of the French economy’s new job creation over that period. Nevertheless, the high 
productivity growth of the manufacturing sector helped free up some labour with no detrimental effect on 
output. Likewise, the construction industry might have been also able to draw labour from the primary and 
tertiary sectors and not solely from manufacturing. 
Figure 6. Labour availability as a constraint on activity
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1.  Share of respondents pointing to the shortage of the labour force as the main factor limiting building activity. 
Source: European Commission. 
                                                      
4  The opening of the French market to workers from eight countries of Eastern Europe (Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic and Slovenia) was done selectively, initially 
(as of May 2006) to address labour shortages in seven sectors and 61 trades, including the building trades. 
However, the effect of the announced partial liberalisation of access to the French labour market was 
probably weaker than in the case of the full opening decided by Spain as of June 2006. France did not take 
this step until 1 July 2008.  
Figure 7. Construction sector outputFehler! Textmarke nicht definiert. 




























Figure 8. Basic hourly wages of manual workers in France 
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Source: ACEMO Quarterly Survey. 
 
  The labour factor would not be able to shift significantly towards a given sector if the capital 
input had not reallocated as well. Data of the French statistical office (INSEE) on the creation of 
enterprises seem to confirm the key role that housing and construction activities played in channelling 
capital: between 2000 and 2007, on average, slightly more than one-fourth of new enterprises were created 
in these two sectors, whereas manufacturing (excluding agribusiness) accounted for only 5%. Over the 
same period, the average rate of business creation was more than 12% in construction, and this rate reached 
nearly 14% in real estate activities, versus slightly under 7% for manufacturing and slightly over 8% for all 
sectors combined.
5 In eight years, the net stock of enterprises grew by around one-fourth in the 
construction industry and more than doubled in real estate activities, but remained stable overall in 
manufacturing. In terms of the number of firms, in 2007, the first two sectors combined outweighed the 
manufacturing sector by a factor of three-to-one, versus two-to-one eight years earlier. 
                                                      
5  The rate of enterprise creation is the ratio of the number of enterprises created in a year to the stock of 
enterprises at 1 January of that year. It is therefore an indication of the renewal of the productive fabric.  
  There remains the question as to the factors that have steered capital in these directions. It would 
seem that the profit outlook had a determinant role. Picart (2004) has shown that construction offered very 
high net operating profit margins (28%) – the highest of any French sector. At the same time, other sectors 
had an average net operating profit margin of 10.5%.
6 Although these figures relate only to the year 2001, 
it is very likely that, until the end of the pre-crisis period at least, construction remained in the lead among 
the most profitable sectors of the French economy. This profitability resulted not from productivity gains 
but from the sustained rise in real estate prices. Indeed, like the pattern observed in a number of other 
countries, house prices trended sharply upwards relative to manufacturing-sector production prices in the 
2000s (Figure 9). According to OECD estimates, they also diverged significantly from their long-term 
trend relative to household income growth and rent trends. In the fourth quarter of 2007, the ratio of house 
prices to households’ income was 41% above the long-term average, and the price-to-rent ratio was 62% 
above its equivalent benchmark (OECD,  2008). Profitability fed by rising house prices thus attracted 
capital and allowed new jobs to be created. However, with limited resources available (existing and new), 
and in the context of weak and slowing potential growth, this phenomenon may have worked against the 
manufacturing sector, and ultimately had a negative impact on French export performance. We test the 
occurrence of such effects in France by capturing them through the ratio of house prices relative to 
producer prices in the manufacturing sector. 
Figure 9. House prices and producer prices in the manufacturing sector 
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  Although expansionary lending activities of banks and increased credit availability over and 
above what various indicators of real activity would suggest could have fuelled house price developments 
(Kierzenkowski and Oung, 2007), policies aimed to support home ownership might also have played a role 
as well. Indeed, various such measures have been introduced or strengthened, thus contributing to the 
buoyancy of the real estate market in the boom phase of the cycle. Their counterproductive effects on 
property prices were all the more likely when the price elasticity of supply was low. They have been added 
to the existing range of traditional incentives such as the housing savings account (Compte épargne 
logement), the housing savings plan (Plan d’épargne logement), conventional loans (prêt conventionné) 
and 1% housing loans (prêt 1% logement). These new measures included: 
•  The creation in 1993 of loans for low–income buyers (prêt à l’accession sociale) aimed at low 
and middle-income households; 
                                                      
6  For example, net operating profit in the mechanical engineering and automotive industries stood at 
between 11.5% and 13%.  
•  The introduction in September 1995 of interest-free housing loans (prêt à 0%) for the purchase of 
new dwellings by first-time home buyers; these loans were extended to the purchase of existing 
dwellings in February 2005. In February 2006, the income thresholds were raised, in particular in 
the areas where real-estate prices had posted a particularly pronounced increase. More recently, the 
amount of interest-free loans for the purchase of new homes has been doubled under the economic 
recovery plan announced at the beginning of December 2008. 
•  Various regional loans, such as interest-free housing loans introduced by the Paris City Council 
on 1 March 2004 to help Parisian households finance the acquisition of new or existing dwellings, 
with or without renovation; 
•  In early 1999, the “Besson scheme” replaced the “Périssol scheme”, providing, under certain 
conditions, tax incentives for homebuyers who have purchased an existing or new unfurnished 
property in order to let it as a principal residence. As regards the purchase of new apartments, the 
“Besson scheme” was subsequently replaced by two other schemes: the “Robien” in 2003 and the 
“Borloo populaire” in 2005. The latter two were replaced in turn by the “Scellier” regime at end-
2009 introduced as of January of that year. 
•  The tax deductions for mortgage interest adopted in mid-2007 as part of the TEPA law (loi en 
faveur du travail, de l'emploi et du pouvoir d'achat); 
  Social housing and urban renewal programmes are an important component of efforts to address 
the problem of poverty and social exclusion. However, shoring up the construction industry by providing 
more direct support for the sector in times of crisis can also slow the redeployment of labour and capital 
resources to other sectors, even more so if the sector had become oversized. This can not only prolong the 
adjustment period (and hence its cost), but the implication of this paper is that it may also impede the 
performance and growth prospects of other sectors of the economy. For instance, one element in the 
economic recovery plan adopted by the French government at the beginning of  2009 was to begin 
construction on 70 000 social housing units, of which 30 000 would be reserved for renting to households 
with the lowest incomes and 40 000 would be rented to middle-class families, with an option to buy. This 
programme came in addition to the State's purchase of 30 000 dwellings from developers who were unable 
to begin construction because of the market downturn.  
5.  Testable equations 
  A reduced-form export equation for the French economy is estimated using quarterly data over 
the period from 1978Q1 to 2007Q2 (118 observations). Except for producer prices in the manufacturing 
sector which are calculated by combining different sources, all other variables (including house prices) 
come from OECD databases and are defined as indices taking the base value of 100 in the year 2000. The 
data are then taken in natural logarithms. 
  In a first step, the estimation is done by evaluating the usual drivers of the volume of exports (X) 
that is indicators of export market volume (EM) and price competitiveness (PC). The standard export 
equation has the following form (Model 1): 
 
t t t t PC EM X ε β β β + + + = 2 1 0
 
 (1) 
  0 , 0 where 2 1 < > β β
 
The export market variable measures the worldwide demand for France’s output and is defined as exports 
that would be expected if its market shares by volume remained at their value for the reference year 2005 
(a standard assumption made by the OECD for all member countries since mid-2008). 
  As already mentioned in the previous section, measures of price competitiveness are not very 
reliable to capture export performance. In order to better capture the competitive position of an economy, it 
is therefore preferable to decompose prices into costs and margins. However, when the latter variable is  
calculated as a difference between price and cost competitiveness indicators (Figures 4 and 5), the 
corresponding coefficient in the export regression is not statistically significant, probably due to the 
aforementioned limitations in measuring export prices. As a result, in a second specification of the model, 
the price competitiveness variable is replaced by the cost competitiveness (CC) measure only (Model 2): 
 




0 , 0 where 2 1 < > β β
 
  The final specification of the export equation is an augmented version of Model 2 that includes 
the prices of houses relative to those of producers in the manufacturing sector (REL). While this ratio was 
rising slowly between 1978 and 1998, it rose sharply thereafter, under the impact of growing house prices 
(Figure 9). It is meant to capture the resource movement of labour and capital from the manufacturing 
sector to construction and real estate activities. The estimated model has the following form (Model 3):  
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6.  Econometric issues 
  We carry out time series cointegration analysis. This is motivated by the willingness to capture 
factors driving the level of exports in France and because the series are integrated of order 1. Whether or 
not the series are cointegrated is analysed in three different ways. First, a two-step Engle-Granger 
procedure is used: unit root tests are employed on the residuals computed on the basis of the long-run 
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respectively, and the betas are parameters of response surface estimates provided in MacKinnon (1991). 
The long-term coefficients are estimated using the dynamic ordinary least squares (DOLS) estimator 
proposed by Stock and Watson (1993). The DOLS includes leads and lags of the regressors in first 
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with k1 and k2 denoting respectively leads and lags, and n being the number of regressors. 
  Second, we also make use of the error correction term as a test of cointegration as Kremers, 
Ericsson and Dolado (1992) argue that it is more powerful than the residual based Dickey-Fuller test. 
Third, the Johansen cointegration technique is used, which is an efficient tool of testing for the number of 
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where Y represents the vector including exports and the set of fundamentals. The VAR-based Johansen 
approach relies on the trace statistic that is compared to the critical values tabulated by Osterwald-Lenum 
(1992). The detection of a single long-term relationship that turns out to be stable over time then validates 
results of the single-equation methods.  
7.  Empirical results 
  All three tests of cointegration indicate the absence of a long-run cointegration relationship at 
conventional significance levels for the standard model, including indicators of worldwide demand 
addressed to France’s producers and price competitiveness (Table 1, Model 1). This is in accordance with 
the findings in the literature on France’s export performance (Villetelle and Nivat, 2006; Cochard, 2008; 
Blot and Cochard, 2008). The tests yield similar results for Model 2 that includes cost competitiveness 
instead of price competitiveness. By contrast, in Model 3, the error–correction terms and Johansen’s trace 
statistic show that export is linked to world demand, cost competitiveness and the relative price of house 
prices related to that of manufactured goods prices via a long–term cointegration relationship. In the later 
case, the error–correction terms is statistically significant and has a negative sign, whereas the trace 
statistic is able to reject the null of no cointegration against the alternative hypothesis of one cointegrating 
vector, but cannot reject the null of one cointegrating vector against the alternative of two cointegrating 
vectors.  
Table 1. Estimation results, 1978:Q1-2007: Q2 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Cointegration tests 
Residual-based tests       
   Test statistic  -0.79  -2.221  -2.522 
Error–correction term  -0.025  -0.067  -0.142** 
Johansen cointegration test       
    Model selected using SIC  m4  m3  m2 
    H0: r=0  31.96  20.85  55.97** 
    H0: r=1  12.63  6.30  19.33 
    H0: r=2  4.09  1.90  8.43 
    H0: r=3     2.97 
Long-run coefficient estimates (DOLS and VECM) 
Model  DOLS VECM DOLS  VECM  DOLS  VECM 
      Constant  3.205**  7.891  5.298**  7.058  4.621**  5.095*** 
      World demand (EM)  0.822**  -0.451  0.736**  0.696***  0.825**  0.861*** 
      Price competitiveness (PC)  -0.518**  -0.677**         
      Cost competitiveness (CC)     -0.882**  -1.224***  -0.684**  -0.768*** 
      Relative price (REL)        -0.140**  -0.176*** 
R-squared adjusted 
(error–correction model) 
0.388  0.348    0.382   
R-squared adjusted 
(long–run equation) 
0.996  0.996    0.996   
No. of obs.  117  116  117  116  117  116 
Notes: *,** and *** denote respectively statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. m2= no linear trend in the I(1) series, constant in the 
cointegrating vector, m3= linear trend in the I(1) series and constant in the cointegrating vector, m4= linear trend in the I(1) series and in the 
cointegrating vector. r=0, r=1, r=2, r=3 refer to the number of cointegrating vectors under the null hypothesis. The Schwartz information criterion 
(SIC) is used to determine the optimal length of lags and leads for DOLS and lags for the VAR model. The maximum lag length is set to equal 4. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
  Replacing the price competitiveness variable in Model 1 by the cost competitiveness indicator 
and adding the relative price variable in Model 3 results in significant coefficient estimates that all have the 
expected signs. An increase in world demand for exports is associated with an increase in observed export 
volumes. Higher costs reduce exports, and, importantly, higher relative prices also lead to a drop in 
exports. This latter finding confirms our hypothesis that a booming construction sector may draw resources 
from the manufacturing sector that in turn penalises exports. 
  Another way of comparing the models is to look at the actually observed export series with those 
derived from the long-run export equations. Figure 10 shows that Model 1 based on the price  
competitiveness variable clearly fails to replicate the pattern of exports from 2003 to mid-2007. This 
confirms earlier findings in the literature. Model 2 includes cost competitiveness instead of price 
competitiveness. The fit of this model is considerably better as it significantly reduces the unexplained part 
at the end of the sample period. Finally, adding relative house prices (Model 3) explains very well the 
evolution of French exports during this decade. The fact that Model 3 provides a better fit mainly in the 
current decade should not come as a surprise as a genuine disconnection of house prices occurred only over 
the last ten years or so (Figure 9).  















































Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
  Our findings withstand the test of a number of robustness checks. First, the results do not depend 
on the choice of the estimators. Indeed, the coefficient estimates have the same size and sign irrespective 
whether the DOLS estimator or the VECM is used (Table 1). Second, the results remain robust to 
alternative specifications. They do not change if the maximum number of lags is set to 2 or 6 and if the 
sample period is extended to the fourth quarter of 2008. 
8.  Extending the empirical analysis to other OECD countries 
  A panel of OECD countries is used to analyse the extent to which the results obtained for France 
can be generalised. For this purpose are selected OECD countries that were not able to fully meet the world 
demand for their exports. These include Australia, Canada, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Norway, 
New Zealand and the United States. Figure 11 shows a growing deterioration of their export performance 
in the period immediately preceding the recent crisis. Moreover, it is noteworthy that this pattern went 
hand in hand with significant increases in house prices relative to manufactured goods prices. 
  Our panel analysis involves two steps. First, the existence of a cointegration relationship between 
exports and the potential explanatory variables is analysed on the basis of the residual-based cointegration 
tests proposed by Pedroni and Kao and using the Johansen cointegration method tailored for panel data. 
Second, the long-run coefficients are estimated using a fixed-effect homogenous dynamic OLS estimator.  





















































































































































































Note: REL is the ratio of prices of houses relative to those of producers in the manufacturing sector. 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook No. 86.  
 
  Model 1 estimated for the seven countries seems to fare equally well as Models 2 and 3: 
cointegration can be established and the long-run coefficient estimates are highly significant with the 
expected signs.
7 However, this is due to composition issues. While the fit of Model 1 for the last ten years 
is poor for Canada, France, Italy, New Zealand and the US, it appears to be very good after 2000 for 
Australia and Norway. A look at the underlying data indeed shows that price competitiveness declined 
dramatically in these two countries, the reason why Model 1 performs well for them and at the aggregate 
                                                      
7  These results are not reported here but are available upon request.  
level. We therefore exclude Australia and Norway from our sample as there is no need to search for 
unconventional explanation of an export underperformance of these two countries. 
  Table 2 shows that the estimation results obtained for Models 1 to 3 for the panel of five 
remaining countries corroborates the times series analysis for France. First, cointegration tests give more 
support for the existence of cointegration for Models 2 and 3 than for Model 1. Second, the coefficient 
estimates are statistically significant, correctly signed and of comparable magnitude. Third, Model 3 is 
selected over Models 1 and 2 on the basis of the adjusted R-squared and two information criteria.
8 These 
findings imply that previous estimates obtained for France also hold for a wider set of OECD countries, for 
which an increase in house prices relative to goods prices in the manufacturing sector can be associated 
with a decrease in exports.  
Table 2. Panel estimation results, 1978:Q1-2007:Q2 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Panel cointegration tests 
Pedroni H0:  no  cointegration 
  p-values   
    Panel v  0.361  0.136  0.043** 
    Panel rho  0.386  0.018**  0.025** 
    Panel PP  0.306  0.009**  0.002** 
    Panel ADF  0.823  0.173  0.110 
    Group rho  0.689  0.035**  0.087* 
    Group PP  0.519  0.006**  0.001** 
    Group ADF  0.961  0.220  0.208 
Kao H0:  no  cointegration 
  p-values  0.037**  0.004**  0.000** 
Panel Johansen cointegration tests 
  p-values       
    H0: r=0  0.030**  0.028**  0.050** 
    H0: r=1  0.797  0.967  0.858 
    H0: r=2  0.296  0.392  0.949 
    H0: r=3      0.928 
Long-run coefficient estimates (DOLS) 
      World demand (EM)  0.789** 0.774**  0.853** 
      Price competitiveness (PC)  -0.571**    
      Cost competitiveness (CC)   -0.460**  -0.392** 
      Relative prices (REL)     -0.175** 
Adj. R-sq.  0.979  0.983  0.985 
AIC -2.594  -2.806  -2.922 
SIC -2.496  -2.708  -2.792 
No. of countries  5  5  5 
No. of obs.  580  580  568 
Note : * and ** denote statistical significance at the 10% and 5% levels. The panel includes Canada, France, the United Kingdom, 
Italy, New Zealand and the United States. 
 
9.  Conclusion 
  This paper confirms the findings in the literature that a standard export equation estimated for 
France, comprising indicators of export market growth and price competitiveness, does not have good 
statistical properties and does not capture the pattern of export developments. Replacing the price 
                                                      
8   The results do not change if time fixed effects are included on top of country fixed effects.  
competitiveness variable by the cost competitiveness indicator improves the quality of the model and leads 
to a reduction of the gap between observed and simulated exports. Subsequently, alongside indicators of 
export market growth and cost competitiveness, the paper considers a relative price variable aimed at 
capturing the resource movement of labour and capital between the manufacturing sector on the one hand, 
and sectors of construction and real estate activities on the other hand. This is done by including the ratio 
of house prices relative to producer prices in the manufacturing sector in a standard export equation. While 
this ratio was relatively stable in France between  1978 and  1998, it rose sharply thereafter, under the 
impact of rising house prices. The model integrating this indicator is robust and has a stronger explanatory 
power of the evolution of French exports, in particular between 2004 and mid-2007. The robustness of this 
finding is confirmed by similar results identified for a group of OECD countries that underwent a boom in 
the real estate sector and a deterioration of export performance, with the latter being unexplained by 
traditional export models. 
  Variations in real estate prices can affect the allocation of production factors, especially if capital 
and labour are scarce and growth potential low. The main economic policy implication that follows from 
this paper is to avoid creating distortions that could have counterproductive effects on price movements 
(amplifying rises or impeding declines), thereby negatively impacting the export sector. The risk of such 
effects can be induced by measures directly supporting the construction sector or by schemes aimed at 
promoting home ownership as they could ultimately lead to or maintain an oversized real estate sector. The 
ongoing downward adjustment of house prices should contribute to reduce the size of the latter and hence 
to free up resources that could be used in export activities going forward. 
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